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THE MONETARY POLICY
TRANSMISSION MECHANISM AND
POLICY RULES IN CANADA
David Longworth Brian O’Reilly
Bank of Canada Bank of Canada
Resumen
El régimen de metas de inflación impuesto en Canadá requiere de un entendimiento claro del
mecanismo de transmisión de la política monetaria y de una metodología para extraer de éste
información útil para la toma de decisiones de política. Este trabajo presenta la visión actual del
Banco de Canadá respecto de los mecanismos de transmisión en Canadá y las investigaciones
internas en las cuales se basa. Además, se presentan algunas investigaciones del Banco sobre reglas
de política. El principal objetivo de investigar en el Banco de Canadá sobre diversos aspectos
relativos al esquema de política monetaria, es encontrar formas de identificar las mayores fuentes de
incertidumbre en la formulación de política monetaria. El componente de incertidumbre se ha
convertido en los últimos años en un tema de investigación teórica y empírica particularmente
importante, centrándose principalmente en cómo manejar la política monetaria en un ambiente de
inflación baja y estable. La sección que concluye resalta tres etapas, identificadas a través de la
experiencia y la práctica dentro del Banco de Canadá, que ayudan a los hacedores de política a
lidiar con la incertidumbre y proveen un enfoque más concreto para dirigir las discusiones en las
reuniones de política monetaria.
Abstract
The inflation-targeting regime in place in Canada requires a clear understanding of the monetary
policy transmission mechanism and a way to exploit knowledge of that mechanism in taking policy
decisions. This paper discusses the Bank of Canada’s current view of the monetary policy
transmission mechanism in Canada and the internal research on which it is based, as well as some
of the Bank’s research on policy rules. The main objectives in the research on various elements of
the monetary policy framework at the Bank of Canada is to find practical ways of addressing the
major types of uncertainty in formulating monetary policy. Uncertainty has become particularly
important as a research and practical issue in recent years with the shift in focus to how to conduct
monetary policy in a low and stable inflation environment. The concluding section outlines three
steps that experience and research has led staff at the Bank of Canada to identify as helpful to policy
makers in dealing with uncertainty and providing a sharper focus to discussions at key meetings on
monetary policy.
_______________________
This paper was prepared for the Third Annual Conference of the Central Bank of Chile “Monetary Policy:
Rules and Transmission Mechanisms”, Santiago, Chile, September 20-21, 1999. We have benefited from the
technical assistance of Hope Pioro and from comments by our colleagues (especially Bob Amano, Tiff
Macklem and Dinah Maclean), by our discussant (Pablo García), and by participants at the conference. The
views expressed in this paper are those of the authors. No responsibility for them should be attributed to the
Bank of Canada.1
I. Introduction
The inﬂation-targeting regime in place in Canada requires a clear understanding of the
monetary policy transmission mechanism and a way to exploit knowledge of that mechanism in
taking policy decisions. This paper describes the Bank of Canada’s current understanding of the
monetary policy transmission mechanism as well as our research, in the context of a model based
on that understanding, to identify policy rules to help guide monetary policy formulation.
Section 2 discusses the Bank’s view of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in
Canada, beginning with the major linkages and then focussing in turn on: transmission through
ﬁnancial variables; the impact of ﬁnancial variables on aggregate demand; and the impact on
inﬂation from the output gap, expectations, and the exchange rate. Because of the importance of
inﬂation projections in the framework used at the Bank of Canada, section 3 reviews the range of
approaches that have been investigated for generating them, including small models of the
Canadian economy, single equation models of quarterly inﬂation, and a fully-speciﬁed model, the
Quarterly Projection Model or QPM. Section 4 outlines recent work at the Bank of Canada on
policy rules. This section covers the QPM policy rule, simulation analyses comparing forward-
looking rules of the QPM type to Taylor rules, and some ongoing work on open-economy
extensions of Taylor-type rules. Given that some of this work suggests that efﬁcient policy rules
can be affected by particular changes in economic behaviour, section 5 outlines some evidence on
such changes in Canada since inﬂation-reduction, inﬂation-control targets were introduced. The
ﬁnal section concludes.
II. The Canadian Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism1
The monetary policy transmission mechanism is complex and our understanding of it is
imperfect. At the Bank of Canada our mainstream paradigm is quite explicit and well known: with
three major sets of linkages. The ﬁrst major linkage is from our instrument, the target band for the
1. This section draws heavily on David Longworth’s notes for a presentation on “Monetary Policy in
Canada” to an IMF course in May 1997.2
overnight (or one-day) interest rate,2 to other ﬁnancial variables: the term structure of market
interest rates, rates on deposits and loans at ﬁnancial institutions (so-called “administered rates”)
and the exchange rate. The second runs from ﬁnancial variables to aggregate demand and the
output gap. And the third set of linkages runs from the output gap, the exchange rate, and inﬂation
expectations to inﬂation.
The precise relationships that underlie these three linkages are probably not ﬁxed. In
particular, we ﬁnd it important to bear in mind that the degrees of success and credibility of the
monetary and ﬁscal policy frameworks will condition the way the transmission mechanism works
in practice. As well, we ﬁnd it useful to have a checklist of the exogenous shocks that typically hit
the economy. (See Diagram 1.)
Transmission through Financial Variables
The Canadian term structure of interest rates is strongly inﬂuenced by the world term
structure of real interest rates, risk premiums related to Canadian government debts and deﬁcits
(relative to those in the rest of the world), and domestic inﬂation expectations. However, it has
generally been true in the past that a rise in nominal domestic short-term rates (and, more
speciﬁcally in recent years, the target band for the overnight rate) has translated into a rise in
nominal domestic rates all along the term structure, with typically smaller effects the further along
the maturity spectrum one is looking. (See Clinton and Zelmer, 1997; Muller and Zelmer, 1998.)
One would expect, however, that this is due to the typical shocks experienced in the past. In the
future, to the extent that a rise in short-term interest rates causes markets to raise their estimate of
the probability of keeping future inﬂation within the inﬂation-control range, longer-term nominal
interest rates may tend to fall or at least not rise.
Bank research has concluded that there has been an essentially stable (if not precise)
relationship between administered interest rates (i.e., rates set by deposit-taking ﬁnancial
institutions on loans and deposits) and market rates of similar maturities. (See Clinton and
Howard, 1994, and Hendry, 1992.) Moreover, the long-run relationship is one in which the
2. The target band for the overnight interest rate is 50 basis points wide, with the Bank aiming to keep the
rate in the middle of the band. Since February 1996, the Bank Rate, the rate at which directly clearing
financial institutions borrow from the Bank of Canada, has been set at the top of the target band. Press
releases are issued at the time of changes in the target band.3
changes in administered rates move one-for-one with the changes in similar market rates. And the
adjustment is quite rapid -- indeed typically much more rapid than in the United States.
The exchange rate responds in an important way to (unexpected) changes in interest rate
differentials between Canada and the major industrial countries (Longworth and Murray, 1988;
Khemani and Murray, 1990). Given our trade patterns, the United States has a very high weight
(about 86 per cent) in our trade-weighted exchange rate index (Lafrance and Antia, 1998-99).
Impact of Financial Variables on Aggregate Demand
In the Bank, the mainstream transmission mechanism is one in which aggregate demand
depends on: (1) the level of real interest rates (relative to equilibrium real interest rates), which
affects consumption spending (especially on durable goods), and which also affects decisions to
invest in housing and non-housing capital; and (2) the level of the real exchange rate, which
affects exports and imports in the usual ways.
The empirical evidence for Canada suggests that it is short-term (and perhaps short- to
medium-term) interest rates that matter the most for aggregate demand. The evidence comes
basically from four sources:
(1) reduced-form equations for changes in output, as well as for changes in exchange
rates, in which interest rates of various maturities are important explanatory variables;
(2) reduced-form equations for changes in output using the spreads between long-term and
various short-term interest rates (Cozier and Tkacz, 1994; Clinton, 1994-95);
(3) evidence from the structure of household and business balance sheets (Longworth and
Poloz, 1995; Montplaisir, 1996-7);
(4) evidence that the components of aggregate demand that move ﬁrst in the business cycle
are consumer durables and housing, which are typically ﬁnanced with debt bearing short- to
medium-term interest rates, rather than business investment.
It is important to note that the effects of interest rates and exchange rates on aggregate
demand build up only slowly over time. There is little contemporaneous effect. But by the third or
fourth quarter the effect is economically signiﬁcant, with the maximum effect reached after six to
eight quarters.4
There is as yet little evidence that direct credit channels (see Bank of Canada, 1995) are
important in affecting aggregate demand. But empirical and theoretical work is ongoing at the
Bank on a direct money channel (Hendry, 1995; Armour et al., 1996; Engert and Hendry, 1998;
Hendry and Zhang, 1998).
In addition to knowing how monetary policy affects aggregate demand, it is important to
identify the major areas where shocks to demand will arise. For the Canadian economy, the major
sources of shocks are: foreign demand (particularly U.S. demand, given the structure of our
trade), domestic ﬁscal policy, and the real world price of commodities (given that Canada is a
major net exporter of commodities and thus its terms of trade tend to move in the opposite
direction from other major industrial countries when real commodity prices change).
Impact on Inﬂation from the Output Gap, Expectations, and the Exchange Rate
As shown in Diagram 1, monetary policy affects inﬂation through three channels: the
output gap, inﬂation expectations, and exchange rate passthrough.
A key part of the mainstream view of the monetary transmission mechanism at the Bank is
the effect of excess demand or supply in product markets on the rate of inﬂation. Thus, changes in
monetary conditions work through their effect on the “output gap” to inﬂuence the inﬂation rate
over time.
As is well known, inﬂation expectations also play a very important role in the inﬂation
process. Although there is evidence that the backward-looking component in these expectations
still remains important, the concentration of the central bank on the achievement of its inﬂation
target no doubt helps to condition the formation of the forward-looking components of these
expectations. And the achievement of the inﬂation-control targets means that the backward-
looking component of these expectations will come to play a stabilizing role at a rate close to the
targeted rate.
Another element in the short-run inﬂation process is changing relative prices. Arising
from a number of sources, these can have once-and-for-all price level effects and therefore
inﬂuence the measured inﬂation rate in the short run, but not necessarily the momentum of the
inﬂation process. Because monetary policy can inﬂuence the exchange rate, exchange rate effects
are particularly important to note in this regard. (See Laﬂèche, 1996-97.) Other speciﬁc shocks5
that have been important in the past include shocks to indirect taxes, energy prices, and food
prices.
It is important to note that the Bank of Canada has relied on the output gap channel to
inﬂuence inﬂation (including the induced effect that the change in actual inﬂation thus produced
has through the backward-looking element of inﬂation expectations). It did not count on
expectations being inﬂuenced by the target during the ﬁrst few years of the inﬂation targeting
regime. As well, it has not relied on the exchange rate passthrough to consumer prices to guide
inﬂation to its target (in strong contrast with the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in the early years
of its inﬂation targeting regime). In principle, exploiting the effects of exchange rate passthrough
could shorten the length of time necessary to hit the inﬂation target, but at the cost of greater
volatility in the economy, including the volatility of real output. In recent years, as inﬂation
expectations have become somewhat inﬂuenced by the targets themselves, exchange rate changes
are now seen as affecting the price level, not the ongoing rate of inﬂation.
III. Inflation Projections
Although the Quarterly Projection Model (QPM) is the main model and organizing
framework for the medium-term projections that are constructed quarterly, both QPM and
projections for inﬂation alone have been informed by a wide range of research with small models.
These models have helped the Bank to understand some of the workings of the economy
better, as well as to explore how to impose appropriate theoretical restrictions and grasp their
implications. Thus, in moving from the overview of the transmission mechanism in the last
section to the description of QPM at the end of this section, it is useful to describe the range of
approaches investigated: (1) research with small “complete” models of the economy, whether
done as reduced forms, vector autoregressions (VAR), or vector error-correction models (VECM);
(2) single equation models of quarterly CPI inﬂation, which are generally Phillips curves; and
(3) models and methods that are useful in monitoring very short-run monthly and quarterly
movements in inﬂation (not discussed in this paper).6
Small Models of the Canadian Economy
In the mid-1980s, Longworth and Poloz (1986) constructed a small model to examine
various policy rules. Its prominent feature was its simplicity: there were four behavioural
equations (output demand, price Phillips curve, money demand, and exchange rate) plus a policy
rule and identities. Simplicity was desirable for a number of reasons. First, so that the model
could be understood both by the modellers and by the policymakers. Second, so that other key
features could be put in place without too much difﬁculty: a coherent ﬂow framework with a well-
deﬁned steady state, expectations that were model-consistent in the long-run despite being
adaptive in the short-run, and exchange rate behaviour that was consistent with convergence to the
steady state. Third, so as to reduce the time required to do stochastic simulations. The model was
calibrated (rather than estimated), based on judgment using estimates by the modellers and others.
This meant that modellers could concentrate on the effects of key variables and their parameters
rather than expending considerable effort in the estimation phase of model building to control for
all the variables that might matter in explaining a given endogenous variable. Thus, for example,
the output equation excluded foreign output, real commodity prices, and ﬁscal variables. The
framework of the four behavioural equations plus the policy rule captured the mainstream model
of monetary transmission in which the real interest rate and real exchange rate affected the output
gap and thus inﬂation. It also set the stage for subsequent estimated reduced-form or VAR models,
many of which omitted money variables, since the stock of money did not enter the equations for
other variables.
For example, Duguay (1994) estimated a reduced-form “IS-curve” for output, in which
changes in Canadian output depend on lags of changes in the real interest rate, the real exchange
rate, U.S. output, real commodity prices, and a ﬁscal policy variable. He also presented a short-
run Phillips curve, based on the previous work of Dupasquier and Girouard (1992).
In the construction of the calibrated QPM model, as well as in subsequent work designed
to calibrate stochastic shocks for use with QPM, a number of VARs were estimated by Bank staff.
Amour et al. (1996) have constructed a VECM in which the deviation of money from its
long-run demand plays an important role. The model contains equations for Canadian output,
prices, money (M1), and interest rates.7
Single Equation Models of Quarterly Inﬂation
The archetypical Canadian model of inﬂation would have the following form:
inﬂation = inﬂation expectations + a*f(gap) + b(L(change in real exchange rate))
+ c(L(change in indirect taxes)
+ d(L(change in food prices))
+ e(L(change in energy prices))
+ residual error
Equations have been estimated for the CPI, core CPI (the CPI ex food and energy and the
effect of indirect taxes), CPI ex food and energy, and CPI ex changes in indirect taxes. Particular
attention has been focused on the formation of inﬂation expectations, and the measurement and
relevant function of the output gap.
Until the last ﬁve years, most work at the Bank had used inﬂation expectations that were
modelled as backward looking, with the sum of the coefﬁcients equal to one. (This was the case,
for example, in Longworth and Poloz, 1986, and Dupasquier and Girouard, 1992.) But when
inﬂation varies around a constant target, there is no longer a unit root in the inﬂation process.
Then, as Thomas Sargent argued in the 1970s, it is inappropriate to model expectations with the
unit restriction on the sum of the coefﬁcients. As one moves from one inﬂation regime to another,
one would expect a learning process, and thus quite a complicated formulation for inﬂation
expectations. Initial steps in modelling such a learning process (as it applies to the actual
evolution of Canadian inﬂation) have been undertaken by Laxton, Ricketts and Rose (1994) and
Ricketts and Rose (1995) using a Markov switching process with three inﬂation regimes. Fillion
and Léonard (1997) have used regimes similar to the ones captured in the Markov switching work
in estimating a quarterly Phillips curve. Their model, which follows closely the archetypical
model above, has inﬂation expectations in the current monetary regime that are close to: 0.39
g(L(inﬂation)) + 0.61 (inﬂation target).
When the monetary authorities act to achieve a given inﬂation target range, inﬂation
expectations at all horizons should eventually fall in line with that range. This reﬂects an increase8
in credibility, and will likely need to be taken into account in projecting inﬂation (see Perrier,
1998; Maclean, 1998; and Amano et al., 1999).
Potential output and, therefore, the output gap are not easily measured. The Bank has
moved from estimating potential output as a linear trend, to constructing it using a Hodrick-
Prescott ﬁlter on actual output, to estimating it using a multivariate ﬁlter that combines structural
information with a ﬁltering approach. The current procedure, which closely follows Butler
(1996), uses a decomposition of potential output into the trend marginal product of labour, times
population, times one minus the trend unemployment rate, times the trend labour force
participation rate, times trend hours worked, divided by the trend of the labour share. Multivariate
ﬁlters are used to estimate each trend. It is recognized that these ﬁlters have problems at the end of
the sample period. St-Amant and van Norden (1997) discuss various approaches to measuring the
output gap that have been used at the Bank and assess their strengths and weaknesses. Kichian
(1999) assesses measures of potential output (and consequently the output gap) using state-space
techniques on a model that includes a Phillips curve.
Until the 1990s, modelling at the Bank typically assumed that Phillips curves were linear
functions of the output gap. Work by Laxton, Rose and Tetlow (1993a, 1993b, 1993c) attempted
to estimate the degree of non-linearity of the Phillips curve and to identify its implications. Their
Monte Carlo studies showed that non-linearities should be difﬁcult to ﬁnd. And their empirical
work showed that a given degree of excess demand has a larger absolute effect on inﬂation than
the same degree of excess supply. Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998a, 1998b) extended this work by
examining the empirical robustness of various theories on the curvature of the Phillips Curve.
They concluded that there is some evidence that the slope of the Phillips curve gets ﬂatter at lower
and more stable rates of inﬂation.
QPM3
The Bank of Canada has long been interested in developing structural macroeconomic
models and using them for economic projections.4 In the late 1970s, the RDXF (for “Research
Department eXperimental Forecasting”) model became the organizing framework for the
3. This section draws heavily on Longworth and Freedman (1995).
4. See Duguay and Longworth (1998) for the history of macroeconomic models and their use in
policymaking at the Bank of Canada.9
projection exercise. By the late 1980s, as the weaknesses of RDXF were becoming all too
obvious, reduced-form aggregate demand and inﬂation equations were used to determine the
important dynamics in the projection, which continued nominally to be performed with the RDXF
framework. Then, in September 1993, QPM was introduced as the Bank’s projection model.
The emphasis on structural models results from three main beliefs:
(1) that economic theory and empirical work suggest the major elements in the monetary
transmission mechanism;
(2) that there is enough stability in some of the major relationships in the economy that it
is sensible to base an estimated or calibrated model on them; and
(3) that in order to conduct policy to achieve an inﬂation-control target (or other nominal
target), it is necessary to have a way of quantifying the link between current changes in interest
rates and future values of the targeted variable.
It is important to note that the use of structural models for economic projections has
always been supplemented by judgment, particularly in the ﬁrst few quarters of the projection.
This judgment would include that based on information from variables which do not enter
explicitly into the structural model, such as the monetary aggregates.
QPM, which built upon knowledge gained with reduced-form and VAR models, was
designed to overcome deﬁciencies of an earlier generation of models, including RDXF, by:
(1) having a fully articulated steady-state version of the model, to which the dynamic
version converges;
(2) incorporating all necessary stock-ﬂow relationships, with the key stocks being
household ﬁnancial wealth, the capital stock, government debt and net foreign assets;
(3) basing household behaviour on the Blanchard-Weil overlapping generations model,
having ﬁrms choose the optimal stock of capital given the production function and the long-run
labour supply, and having governments choose a desired long-run debt-to-GDP ratio; and
(4) incorporating both forward-looking (“model consistent”) and backward-looking
elements in expectations.10
It is virtually impossible to impose all the desired long-run restrictions in an estimated
model with forward-looking expectations where the data are drawn from a number of different
monetary policy regimes. Therefore, it was decided that the best of the second-best ways of
assigning coefﬁcients would be to calibrate the model, largely on the basis of existing empirical
evidence.
Because of the way in which the model was calibrated (which depended to an important
extent on the information on dynamics found in VARs), the short-run dynamics of the model are
similar in many ways to models without stock-ﬂow dynamics. To understand the short-run
dynamics of the model, the key parts of the model -- described more fully below -- are as follows:
(1) aggregate demand, which depends importantly on interest rates and exchange rates:
(2) the price-wage nexus;
(3) the monetary policy reaction function; and
(4) the behaviour of the exchange rate and long-term bond rate.
The major aggregate demand components in the model are consumption (which includes
housing and inventory accumulation), business ﬁxed investment, government expenditure on
goods and services, exports and imports. In the short run, consumption is negatively related to the
term spread between short-term and long-term interest rates. Business ﬁxed investment responds
to the cost of capital, and exports and imports are inﬂuenced by the real exchange rate.
The price-wage nexus in the model is somewhat complicated, as future prices and future
costs appear in both equations. In setting prices, ﬁrms use lagged prices, forward-looking
expected costs (including indirect tax effects) and forward-looking expected prices. Output gaps
also affect inﬂation, and the relationship is non-linear with a given amount of excess demand
having a larger absolute effect on inﬂation than an equivalent amount of excess supply. In addition
to these factors, the CPI excluding food and energy depends upon import prices, and thus the
exchange rate. Costs depend largely on nominal wages, which in turn depend on expected future
prices, expected future nominal wages, lagged nominal wages, the real-wage target (determined
by the equilibrium marginal product of labour) and the labour market gap.11
The monetary policy instrument in the model is the short-term interest rate. This rate is
determined by a monetary-policy reaction function which expresses the yield curve gap -- the
difference between the short-term interest rate (three-month rate) and the long-term interest rate
(ten-year interest rate) minus its equilibrium value -- as a function of the deviation of inﬂation
(based on the CPI excluding food and energy) from the inﬂation control target six to seven
quarters in the future. The reaction function also includes a lagged dependent variable to smooth
the movement of the yield curve gap. The equation can be written as:
 (1)
where , is the deviation of inﬂation from its targeted
rate, and are the short- and long-term interest rates respectively, and ss denotes a steady-state
value.
The ten-year interest rate is given by a weighted average of the future short rates (adjusted
by a term premium), the current short-term interest rate (adjusted by a term premium), and the
foreign long-term interest rate (adjusted by a risk premium and the expected international
inﬂation differential).
The exchange rate is determined by the uncovered interest parity condition, including a
risk premium. In the long run, the equilibrium real exchange rate adjusts so that the ﬂow of net
exports is sufﬁcient to sustain the equilibrium net foreign asset position (which, in turn, is
determined by household preferences, the desired stock of government debt, and the real interest
rate).
IV. Policy Rules5
Svensson (1998) describes a monetary rule as a “prescribed guide for monetary policy
conduct.” The rule reacts in a mechanical way to a pre-speciﬁed information set. In reality, as
5. This section draws heavily from Amano, Coletti and Macklem (1999) and Côté and Macklem (BIS) and
Maclean (1999).
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discussed in Svensson (1999), central banks, in forming policy, consider all the information
available about the economy, attempt to distinguish which shocks are occurring, and then modify
their tactics and strategy accordingly.
A monetary rule is important for the policy advice provided to senior management as part
of a model-based projection exercise. Each projection the staff at the Bank of Canada try to
identify, in the context of a model, the various shocks affecting the economy and to quantify their
impact on inﬂation. To provide consistent policy advice, it is necessary to have a systematic
response of movements in the policy instrument to the various shocks. If the policy reaction
function used by the staff continually changed, policy makers would be unable to differentiate
between changes in the outlook stemming from shocks, and those arising from changes in the
policy reaction function. A stable reaction function provides a consistent link from projection to
projection to help in the analysis of the implications of new information. Similarly, a benchmark
policy reaction function provides a base line comparison for assessing the implications of
different policy reactions (delayed, pre-emptive, etc.). Such assessments are often provided, for
example, in the alternative scenarios generated as part of the projection exercise.6
An ideal policy rule, as encapsulated in a reaction function in a model, is one which
captures the central bank’s general preferences in terms of bringing inﬂation back to target within
an acceptable time frame, without causing unacceptable deviations in output from potential or
unacceptable movements in the monetary instruments (i.e., there is an implicit loss function). The
rule should be one which performs well on average, rather than just with respect to one particular
set of shocks. Much of the early work on monetary rules in QPM looked at model responses to
deterministic shocks, mainly because the size of the model and the computing resources then
available did not allow us to consider stochastic simulations. This early approach was followed in
full recognition that the results obtained from deterministic simulations are very dependent on the
particular shocks imposed. More recently, Bank researchers have been using stochastic
simulations, as well as analytic work based on small theoretical models, to examine whether we
can improve on the current monetary rule in QPM.
6. Longworth and Freedman (1995) discuss the role of the staff economic projection in the conduct of
monetary policy.13
The Initial (and Current) QPM Policy Rule
In a forward-looking model like QPM, the role of the monetary authority is to provide a
nominal anchor for the economy. Because inﬂation expectations depend, at least in part, on future
monetary policy, a policy rule needs to be speciﬁed in terms of an attainable nominal objective.
Without an endogenous policy response to economic developments, agents do not have enough
information to form their expectations, and nominal values become undeﬁned (in other words, the
model does not solve). An endogenous policy rule or reaction function is therefore an essential
part of QPM. As noted above, QPM uses the short-term interest rate as the policy variable that has
to adjust to achieve the inﬂation target.
Although this reaction function is an ad hoc rule, in the sense that it is not derived from an
optimal control problem, the choice of parameters and the degree of forward-lookingness were
chosen in the context of what we had learned in previous work or by experience. The six-to-seven
quarters horizon approximates well the sort of horizon over which monetary policy has a
meaningful effect on trend inﬂation. Trying to hit an inﬂation target over a very short period of
time would imply considerable volatility in interest rates (and the exchange rate), possibly leading
to instrument instability. Even though the reaction function does not allow for secondary
objectives other than smoothing of the policy instrument, the magnitude of the key parameter,
in equation 1, which is linked to the degree of inﬂation volatility that the authorities are ready to
accept, was also chosen taking into consideration that the authorities care about the volatility of
output as well.
The use of a forward-looking rule implies that the monetary authority has knowledge of
the origin and nature of recent shocks. In a model in which private agents are assumed to be (at
least partly) forward-looking, it would be hard to argue that the authorities should not be
characterized by the same behaviour. Because there is a lot of uncertainty, QPM is built with
enough ﬂexibility to allow the implications of different policy responses to be considered by
changing the reaction function in various ways.
Forward-looking versus Taylor Rules
Reaction functions, like that in QPM, that involve adjusting interest rates to the expected
future deviation of inﬂation from its target level are considered to belong to the class of inﬂation-
forecast-based (IFB) policy rules. While these rules can allow for interest-rate smoothing (as in
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QPM) or include other terms, such as the contemporaneous output gap as discussed below, their
main distinguishing feature is their forward-lookingness with respect to inﬂation.
Reaction functions in which interest rates respond both to deviations of inﬂation from its
target level and to deviations of output from potential, but using only contemporaneous or past
information, are considered to be Taylor-type policy rules (Taylor, 1993). The original Taylor rule
was derived for the United States, a closed economy, but it can be extended into an open-economy
form as shown by Ball (1999) and Srour (1999) and discussed below.
Black, Macklem and Rose (1998) use a model of the Canadian economy, CPAM
(Canadian Policy Analysis Model), which has many features of QPM but simulates much faster
than QPM, to investigate the consequences of variants of these two types of policy rules as well as
a price level rule.7 They ﬁrst examine the stochastic behaviour of the economy, drawing random
shocks from those identiﬁed with VAR analysis. They ﬁnd that the base-case CPAM reaction
function produces inﬂation outcomes considerably better than historical outcomes, though
roughly in line with the experience in Canada since 1992 when inﬂation targets came into effect.
When alternative parameterizations of IFB rules are compared in terms of the root-mean-squared
deviations (RMSDs) of inﬂation relative to the target and of the output gap, they discover rules
that produce lower RMSDs of both inﬂation and output than the base case rule. This result usually
occurs for a more vigorous reaction to an expected deviation of inﬂation from the target, and
therefore implies more interest rate volatility than the CPAM/QPM rule.
They note that their results highlight that in an open economy two channels exist through
which the monetary authority can control inﬂation - - the output gap and the exchange rate - - and
these different channels produce IFB rules with quite different properties. Because the lags in the
exchange rate channel are shorter than those through the output-gap channel, the monetary
authority can achieve substantially better inﬂation control using the exchange rate channel. This
comes at the cost, however, of considerably more variability in interest rates, the exchange rate,
and output. Owing to the non-linearity in the Phillips curve in CPAM (and QPM), the higher
variance of output also results in a lower level of output. Controlling inﬂation through the output
7. With respect to the latter type of rule, their results show a significant improvement in the trade-offs facing
the policy makers when they allow expectations to adjust to take account of the effects of price-level control.15
gap has the advantage that stabilizing inﬂation requires leaning against the output gap, which both
reduces output variability and raises the average level of output.
In their simulations of Taylor-type rules, they ﬁnd (as have others) “optimal” coefﬁcients
to be much higher than those suggested by Taylor’s estimated rule characterizing historical U.S.
Federal Reserve policy. They also ﬁnd that, relative to IFB rules, Taylor rules produce roughly
similar results if the comparison only focuses on the RMSDs of inﬂation and output. However,
deeper analysis leads them to conclude that a Taylor rule is less appealing since: (1) it is not
generally capable of achieving the inﬂation target on average in CPAM without an explicit
modiﬁcation to allow for a shift in the mean of output; and (2) the volatility of interest rates is
relatively high, sometimes high enough in absolute terms that a considerable proportion of
observations have negative nominal interest rates. With IFB rules, where the dynamic structure of
the model is taken into account, results are achieved with instrument settings that are much less
volatile.
Recent internal work by Maclean using stochastic simulations examines the performance
of various policy rules from the perspective of their impact on inﬂation, output and interest rate
variability when the model economy is hit by stochastic shocks that approximate those that the
Canadian economy normally experiences. Comparisons are made between the results from IFB-
type rules, non-linear rules which do not react until inﬂation falls outside the bands, and Taylor-
type rules.
With respect to the IFB rules, the QPM reaction function described above is modiﬁed by
adding a contemporaneous output gap term to the forward-looking inﬂation gap term.8 The non-
linear rules allow for the possibility of no or very little monetary policy reaction as long as
inﬂation is moving within the target bands by adding a term to reﬂect an additional weight on the
deviation of inﬂation from its target 6 to 7 periods ahead if inﬂation is outside the target band. The
Taylor-type rules have the standard (closed economy) formulation. Various rules in each of the
three basic classes are obtained by varying the weights on the inﬂation and output gap terms.
Each reaction function being considered is incorporated into QPM in turn and stochastic
simulations of the resultant model economy are run. The shocks used for the stochastic
8. The inflation gap term looks 6 to 7 quarters ahead, while the output gap term is an average of the
contemporaneous and one lag of the output gap.16
simulations are calibrated to be generally representative of the historical distribution of shocks
affecting the Canadian economy. The results of the experiments are summarized in terms of
output, inﬂation and interest rate variability. Not enough simulations were run to determine which
rule might be an optimal one but the results provide some indicative evidence on the relative
performance of each class of rule considered.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 1 (taken from Maclean’s work) shows the outcomes from
simulating the various monetary policy rules. Each curve/locus shows the outcome for rules with
the same weight on the output gap term and varying weights on the inﬂation gap term, with
outcomes shown in terms of the variability of the deviations of inﬂation from target versus either
the variability of the output gap or the variability of interest rates.
As may be seen, Maclean ﬁnds that, for relatively low weights on the output gap,
increasing the weight on the output gap reduces output variability without increasing inﬂation
variability. This is the case, for example, in moving from a rule with a weight on the inﬂation gap
of 1.65 and a zero weight on the output gap to a rule with the same weight on the inﬂation gap and
a weight of 0.25 on the output gap. This is not true, however, for higher weights on the output gap,
where more of a trade-off with inﬂation variability emerges. When the weight on the output gap
reaches 1.5, output variability actually increases compared to the case of a weight of 1. Too high a
weight on the output gap term increases cycling in the real economy. For any given weight on the
output gap, increasing the weight on the inﬂation gap (i.e. moving along the locus) gives the
expected clear trade-off between inﬂation and output variability.
With respect to the variability of inﬂation versus the variability of interest rates, when the
absolute value of the weight on the output gap is small, the weight can be increased without
increasing interest rate variability, but as the weight becomes larger a clear trade-off starts to
emerge. With respect to the former observation, increasing the weight on the output gap from 0 to
0.25 reduces interest rate variability for all weights on the inﬂation gap, while increasing the
weight further to 0.5 still leads to lower interest rate variability compared to the 0 locus for many
of the points.
Overall, Maclean’s results support previous internal work at the Bank based on a stripped-
down version of QPM with stochastic shocks which suggested that, by introducing a17
contemporaneous output gap term, it is possible to make an improvement to the current rule in
terms of reducing the variability of both output and inﬂation with little change in the variability of
interest rates. In order to achieve this, there should be a greater weight on the inﬂation gap term
than currently used in QPM and a small weight (rather than a zero weight as in QPM) on an
output gap term.
The beneﬁt of adding the output gap is that it allows the monetary authority to distinguish
between price level and demand shocks and thus to differentiate its policy response. Adding an
output gap term into the rule does not mean that the monetary authority is targeting output. The
role of the output gap is to provide more information to the monetary authority about the source of
the movements in inﬂation.9
While adding an output gap term to a forward-looking rule appears beneﬁcial, placing too
great a weight on the output gap is a problem. It causes increased cycling in both output and
interest rates. This is likely due to the fact that it shifts too much weight away from the forward-
looking term (the inﬂation gap 6-7 periods ahead). This result contrasts with the properties of a
Taylor rule where both the output gap and inﬂation gap terms are contemporaneous. With such a
rule, it is the output gap term which has the more forward-looking information. However, in
comparing the forward-looking rule with a closed economy formulation of the Taylor rule,
Maclean suggests that Taylor-type rules do not do as well as forward-looking rules in terms of
average variabilities. She makes it clear that this conclusion is tentative because there was no
attempt to search over a wide range of coefﬁcients or formulations to identify the most efﬁcient
Taylor rule.
She also shows that pursuing a more opportunistic policy, where the monetary authority
does not react greatly to deviations of inﬂation from the mid-point if inﬂation is still within the
bands, but only reacts when inﬂation is expected to fall outside the bands, will increase the
probability of falling outside the bands. This suggests the monetary authority should actively try
to move inﬂation back toward the mid-point, even when inﬂation is within the bands.
9. In exploratory work on the sensitivity of monetary policy rules to shocks, Bob Amano discussed how
monetary policy would respond to an adverse supply-side price shock under a Taylor rule to demonstrate
how the increased information provided by the output gap is helpful.18
Finally, initial results with regard to an interest rate smoothing term in the reaction
function suggest that smoothing causes greater variability of inﬂation and output, though the costs
of small amounts of smoothing are low. The variability of inﬂation can be reduced with no
increase in the volatility of the change in interest rates, by adopting a rule with greater smoothing
and more aggressive weights on the gap. This is at the cost, however, of larger changes in the level
of interest rates, and greater output variability. Again, at low rates of smoothing, the costs are
relatively low. Some degree of smoothing is likely beneﬁcial therefore, and in fact the degree of
smoothing suggested by these results is consistent with the smoothing already incorporated in the
current monetary rule in QPM.
Open-Economy Extensions
Some analytic work on the implications of being an open economy for the form of the
policy rule has been done at the Bank (Srour, 1999). Srour considers the role of the exchange rate
in policy formulation extending the work of Ball (1999).
Ball (1999) uses a very simple model with constant coefﬁcients to show that the optimal
policy rule in a small open economy is similar to the Taylor rule. It differs from the Taylor rule in
that it is not expressed in terms of the interest rate but in terms of an index that is a weighted
average of the real interest rate and the real exchange rate with the weights roughly proportional
to the coefﬁcients of the same variables in the IS curve. As well, the inﬂation rate is adjusted to
ﬁlter out direct but temporary effects of the exchange rate.
Srour notes that Ball’s results depend on the assumption that the shocks are white noise
and in particular are uncorrelated across equations. He observes that this assumption is not true in
a small economy like Canada’s where variables such as commodity prices or foreign output affect
both the exchange rate and demand. Therefore, he extends Ball’s model to include new exogenous
explanatory variables, , with the result that the optimal policy rule takes the form:
where: all variables are measured as deviations from their average values, can be
viewed as a monetary conditions index (MCI) with  the real interest rate and  the log of the
real exchange rate (a greater  means an appreciation);  is the output gap;  is a
measure of inﬂation that excludes the direct, but temporary effects of exchange rate movements,
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hereafter referred to as “core-core inﬂation;” w, A and B are positive constants with ;
and C as a constant vector that depends on the parameters of the model excluding the coefﬁcient
on  in the exchange rate equation.
The implications for the response of the MCI to innovations in output or modiﬁed inﬂation
is unaffected relative to Ball’s model since the effects of such innovations on future output and
inﬂation have not changed. However, the MCI now must respond to innovations in X, since these
will affect the future path of output and inﬂation. The extent to which the MCI must respond to
innovations in X depends on the nature of the innovation.
Srour notes that an autonomous rise in the exchange rate would require constant monetary
conditions whereas a rise due to an increase in real commodity prices would require tighter
monetary conditions. The reason for the latter response is that, other things equal, higher real
commodity prices lead to more demand.
The Bank staff would like to have a robust Taylor-type reaction function incorporating the
extensions of Ball and Srour that could be substituted into QPM to generate results that would
provide another perspective (to a model with an IFB reaction function) for internal discussions on
monetary policy. In this vein, a focused effort will be made over the next while to identify a
suitable rule for this purpose. Suitable here means a reaction function that is robust across several
models rather than one optimized for QPM only. Below, some preliminary simulation analysis is
discussed.
Exploratory simulation work at the Bank to date has considered a Ball-type open-
economy Taylor rule and for comparison purposes two alternative formulations of the base Taylor
rule, one using the core-core inﬂation measure and the other the core inﬂation measure. This work
examines what happens to the responses of key variables under a standard set of shocks in
deterministic simulations and what happens to the trade-off frontiers between the variances of
inﬂation, interest rate and output gaps when the weights on the output and inﬂation gaps in the
reaction function are changed. For the latter simulations, the historical distribution of shocks to
the Canadian economy was the same as that used by Maclean.
The exchange rate passthrough parameter is thought to be around 0.2 for core inﬂation.
That is, a 1 per cent depreciation of the real exchange rate will result in a 0.2 per cent increase in
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the price level after about 8 quarters. The relative weight on the real exchange rate in the MCI in
Canada is 0.33 versus 1.0 on the interest rate term. Note that while it is the yield spread gap rather
than the real interest rate that affects real activity in QPM, other internal work suggests that the
relative weights on the real exchange rate and real interest rate remain about the same in IS-curve
estimations.
The measures of inﬂation and output gaps that are available for Canada are, or can be
made to be, consistent with those in the theoretical models. A somewhat more difﬁcult issue for
an open economy that is not in equilibrium is how to measure the exchange rate gap since the
equilibrium exchange rate in the model’s steady state is unlikely to be the relevant one for policy
purposes. Since the theoretical models make no distinction in the exchange rate term for the
passthrough effect and for the MCI term, the year-to-year change in the exchange rate was used in
our reaction functions.10 The reaction function was coded with the yield spread gap on the left-
hand side and the real exchange rate weighted by its MCI weight (0.33) on the right-hand side.
The core-core inﬂation term was constructed using a parameter of 0.2 on the year-to-year change
in the exchange rate.
The initial experiments for variants of the Taylor rule were deterministic ones in which the
standard simulations used at the Bank for assessing the implications of any change for the model
properties were undertaken to see how the model behaved under each form of the Taylor rule
considered.11 While more work needs to be done to reﬁne and understand the results, the most
general observation is that the results from the open-economy Taylor rule show less cycling for
inﬂation, interest rates, the exchange rate and the output gap than do the results for the other two
forms of the Taylor rule considered. These results should not be all that surprising given the more
complete representation, relative to the variants of the base Taylor rule used, of how policy is
actually formulated and implemented in Canada. The results from the two other Taylor rules do
10. That is, the exchange rate lagged one year is used to represent the short-term equilibrium. It is not clear
that this the appropriate thing to do. In an artificial economy, the long-run equilibrium is always constant, so
it might be better to use the level of e in calculating the MCI and the year-to-year change of e in estimating
the exchange rate passthrough.
11. The following types of shocks are considered: a disinflation shock; an inflation shock; a demand shock;
an exchange rate shock; a commodity price shock; a productivity shock; an indirect tax shock; a corporate
tax shock; a government size shock; government debt shock; and a foreign shock.21
not differ enough to say that either one shows less cycling than the other when all of the
simulation results are considered.
The next set of experiments were stochastic ones that used the same three versions of the
Taylor rule as for the deterministic simulations and the representation of historical shocks used by
Maclean. As is typical in this work, results were generated for a range of coefﬁcients on the
inﬂation gap term (0.5, 1.0, 1.25, 1.65, 2.0, 3.0 and 4.0) and for a range of coefﬁcients on the
output gap term (0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5). Only selected results will be considered here. Results are
plotted for the variance of inﬂation against the variance of the output gap and for the variance of
inﬂation against the variance of the interest rate gap. In Figure 2, each graph has three curves,
each corresponding to one of the three Taylor rules considered. Two sets of graphs are shown.
Each set corresponds to a different weight on the output gap term (0.5 and 1.0). The curves in
each graph are constructed by joining the various points generated using the relevant output gap
weight and a range of weights on the inﬂation gap term.
From Figure 2 it can be seen that using core-core inﬂation in the basic Taylor rule (the
dotted line in the graphs) leads to a relatively worse trade-off frontier (and an attenuated one),
especially for that between the variance of inﬂation and the variance of the interest rate, than for
either of the other two Taylor rules. It seems that using an underlying measure of inﬂation that
removes the exchange rate effect without allowing the exchange rate to be directly considered in
setting the instrument leads to a perverse dynamic. (Indeed this dynamic ultimately causes the
simulations to fail for higher weights on the inﬂation gap.)
When movements in the exchange rate are taken into account as in the Ball-type open-
economy Taylor rule, it seems that there might be some room for improving the relative
performance of the trade-off frontiers from those obtained using a closed-economy formulation.
With a higher weight (1.0) on the output gap, including the exchange rate does seem to reduce
interest rate volatility (and presumably exchange rate volatility) and makes little difference for
output variability.12 However, this is at the expense of greater inﬂation variability. These results
are demonstrated in Figure 2.
12. Exchange rate variability and interest rate variability resulting from these stochastic simulations are
highly correlated.22
In calibrating the shocks to be used for stochastic simulations in Maclean’s work and the
preliminary investigations reported above, the variability of the exchange rate ended up below that
seen historically -- a trade-off that was made to ensure the variabilities of other key variables were
consistent with historical experience. If the stochastic simulations are changed slightly to ensure
that the resulting exchange rate varibility is more in line with historical experience, the resulting
trade-off frontiers, as shown in Figure 3, are even more suggestive that it might be helpful to use a
Ball-type open-economy Taylor rule.
Work at the Bank will continue on reﬁning the conceptual underpinnings of an open-
economy Taylor rule at the same time as a concerted effort will be made, using simulation
analysis and different models, to ﬁnd a robust representation of a Taylor rule that can be used to
aid in the discussions on monetary policy formulation.
V. Policy Rules and Recent Changes in Economic Behaviour in Canada
Economic behaviour appears to have changed during the period over which inﬂation
targeting has been in place in Canada in a way that has implications for our inﬂation-forecast-
based policy rule. There is evidence, suggestive or stronger, of: increasing Bank of Canada
credibility (some of these are regularly reported in our semi-annual Monetary Policy Report); a
ﬂattening of the Phillips curve; and more room for countercyclical ﬁscal policy. The implications
of each of these are addressed in Amano, Coletti and Macklem (1998). They conclude that
changes in credibility would require a recalibration of the inﬂation-forecast-based rule to avoid a
worsening in outcomes, that a ﬂatter Phillips curve would increase output volatility for a given
level of inﬂation control, and that increased room for countercyclical ﬁscal policy seems to
improve the trade-off between output and inﬂation variability.
More ﬁrmly anchored expectations?
Overall, we would interpret the results of several studies on this question as showing that
credibility has improved during the inﬂation-reduction, inﬂation-control period.13 Johnson
(1998), for example, uses survey measures of expected inﬂation from 1984 to 1995 to examine the
13. Studies include Svensson (1993), Johnson (1997; 1998), Amano et al. (1997), and Perrier (1997).23
credibility of monetary policy across 18 industrialized countries, including Canada. He concludes
that Canada and New Zealand have the most credible targets among the inﬂation-targeting
countries. Perrier (1998) uses survey data on expected inﬂation from the Conference Board of
Canada. He concludes that these data suggest that the Bank of Canada has developed increasing
credibility over the inﬂation-targeting period. These studies are based on formal regression
analysis, but the ﬂavour of their results can be captured by simply looking at the behaviour of
survey measures of inﬂation in the 1990s.
In the Conference Board of Canada’s quarterly Survey of Forecasters (July 1999, the most
recent available), the average forecast rates of inﬂation for 1999 and 2000 are 1.5 and 1.7 per cent,
respectively. The Conference Board also surveys businesses; from the results, one can infer the
distribution of expected year-to-year price increases over the next six months. Figure 4 (from our
semi-annual Monetary Policy Report) provides a time series of the percentage of business
respondents that expected inﬂation would be a certain level or less. As shown, a full 100 per cent
of the respondents expect Canadian inﬂation to be 3 per cent (the upper band of the inﬂation
range) or less over the next while. Longer-term inﬂation forecasts, reported by the Consensus
Economics Inc. survey of forecasters, also show a similar convergent trend. These forecasts
suggest that longer-term (two, ﬁve, and ten years ahead) inﬂation expectations are in line with the
midpoint (2 per cent year-to-year) of the ofﬁcial inﬂation target band (Figure 5, also from our
semi-annual Monetary Policy Report).
Other measures of monetary uncertainty suggestive of reduced uncertainty are reviewed in
Amano, Coletti and Macklem (1999). They include: the dispersion of inﬂation forecasts across
forecasters; the average deviation of inﬂation forecasts from the inﬂation target; the difference
between the yield on Government of Canada long-term Real Return Bonds and comparable
maturity nominal bonds, a proxy for long-term inﬂation expectations (also included in our semi-
annual Monetary Policy Report); and the length of debt contracts.
In their work Amano, Coletti, Macklem show that the effect of increasing credibility is to
shift the policy frontier closer to the origin. However, they also ﬁnd that the rule (deﬁned by the
degree of forward-lookingness on inﬂation and by the weight on the inﬂation gap term in a
reaction function) that was on the frontier is unlikely to be on the frontier when credibility is
increased. One reason is that with increased credibility the forecasting horizon of private sector24
agents shortens and the monetary authority should take this into account by shortening the
horizon in its reaction function. There is also some indication that increasing the weight on the
inﬂation gap improves the trade-off frontier.
Changes in the slope of the Phillips curve
For Canada, Dupasquier and Ricketts (1998 a and b) consider ﬁve different models of
asymmetric price adjustment and examine the testable implications of each model on aggregate
price data. They ﬁnd a signiﬁcant and positive relationship between the expected rate of inﬂation
and the slope of the Phillips curve. However, when the Lucas (the misperceptions or signal
extraction model) and menu-cost (or costly adjustment) models are considered together, they ﬁnd
it difﬁcult to discriminate empirically between whether the ﬂatter slope is due to a lower standard
deviation of inﬂation as implied by the Lucas model or a lower mean of inﬂation as implied by the
menu cost model. Nevertheless, their empirical evidence is suggestive of a ﬂattening of the
Phillips curve in an environment of low and stable inﬂation.
If the Phillips curve becomes ﬂatter at lower rates of inﬂation, then disinﬂations that begin
at lower inﬂation rates should be more costly. However, for demand shocks, a ﬂatter Phillips curve
means that inﬂation will move away from its target more slowly, so the variance of inﬂation may
fall. Debelle (1996) examines the last three Canadian disinﬂations and ﬁnds a negative
relationship between the initial level of inﬂation and the resulting sacriﬁce ratio. In particular, he
ﬁnds that the sacriﬁce ratio associated with the 1974-76 disinﬂation is 0.4 when the initial level of
inﬂation was 11.5 per cent; the ratio for the 1981-85 disinﬂation is 2.0 when inﬂation was 12.9 per
cent; and the sacriﬁce ratio of the 1990-93 disinﬂation is 3.5 when inﬂation was 5.3 per cent.
For a given inﬂation expectations formation process, a ﬂatter Phillips curve shifts the
trade-off frontier (for inﬂation and output variability) such that output volatility is higher,
especially for rules with a short forecasting horizon (Amano, Coletti and Macklem, 1999). The
latter is to be expected as the stronger response of short-horizon rules, as opposed to longer-
horizon rules, to prospective inﬂationary pressures creates more output variability. As the Phillips
curve becomes ﬂatter the marginal cost, in terms of output variability, of better inﬂation control
increases. Unlike changing credibility where there was a signiﬁcant effect on the calibration of the
rules, ﬂattening the Phillips curve does not have a pronounced effect on which rules are good
ones.25
Changes in ﬁscal policy
From the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, unsustainable structural deﬁcits produced a steady
increase in the ratio of net government debt to gross domestic product in Canada, rising from 5
per cent in 1974 to 70 per cent in 1996.14 Over this period, Canada’s net debt-to-GDP ratio moved
from fourth highest among the G-7 countries to second highest.
In response, Canadian ﬁscal authorities in the 1990s launched a variety of measures
intended to ﬁrst stabilize and, then eventually reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio. Beginning with its
1994/95 budget, the Canadian federal government set short-term deﬁcit targets to provide
economic agents and ﬁnancial markets with an anchor as to where ﬁscal policy was going. Over
the ﬁve years in which the deﬁcit targets have been in place, the Canadian federal government has
consistently overachieved its announced target. In addition, six of Canada’s ten provinces and
both of its territories have enacted either legislation or constitutional constraints on government
deﬁcits, taxes, expenditure, or debt.15 These measures (together with cyclical improvements in
economic activity) have reduced the overall government deﬁcit as a proportion of GDP from
approximately 8.0 per cent in 1992 to a small surplus in 1998. The overall government net debt-
to-GDP ratio in Canada has fallen with further reductions in the debt-to-GDP ratio expected. As a
result, the constraints on the federal government’s ability to behave countercyclically in the recent
past are becoming less and less binding.
A more countercyclical ﬁscal policy allows a beneﬁcial shift in the efﬁcient policy frontier
in the sense that for a given level of inﬂation control, output volatility is lower and vice versa with
only small changes in which monetary policy rules are most efﬁcient. When ﬁscal policy can be
more countercyclical, the beneﬁcial effects for the efﬁcient frontier arise from the ability to use
automatic stabilizers with their faster (than monetary policy) effects on aggregate demand and
from the complementarity of ﬁscal and monetary policy in responding to most shocks.
14. Unless otherwise specified, net government debt is net consolidated debt across federal, provincial, and
municipal governments as measured on a National Accounts basis.
15. See Millar (1997).26
VI. Some Concluding Remarks
This paper has discussed the Bank of Canada’s current view of the monetary policy
transmission mechanism in Canada and the research on which it is based as well as some of the
Bank’s current, and ongoing, research on policy rules, or more accurately reaction functions. The
main objectives in the research on various elements of the monetary policy framework at the Bank
of Canada is to ﬁnd practical ways of addressing the major types of uncertainty in formulating
monetary policy.
Uncertainty has become particularly important as a research and practical issue in recent
years for several reasons. In Canada and many other countries, there has been a shift in focus from
how to achieve low inﬂation to how to conduct monetary policy in a low and stable inﬂation
environment. In the latter environment the treatment of risks has become more symmetric. At the
same time, increased international linkages have added to the sources of uncertainties while
technology advances have increased economists capability to deal with uncertainty.
The major types of uncertainty facing policy makers are: shock uncertainty, parameter
uncertainty, data uncertainty and model uncertainty. Shock uncertainty has three elements:
additive (random) uncertainty; uncertainty about the persistence of shocks; and uncertainty
surrounding the results from deterministic simulations implying the need for conﬁdence bands.
Parameter uncertainty reﬂects the fact that the responses of key variables to changes in the
instrument are not known with certainty. Data uncertainty results from the difﬁculty of measuring
precisely such things as inﬂation and the output gap. Model uncertainty arises because the true
model of the economy can never be known for sure.
At the Bank of Canada, experience and research has led the staff to identify three steps
that can help policy makers to deal with uncertainty and provide a sharper focus to discussions at
key meetings on monetary policy.
•  With respect to the reaction function, the main one used should capture the policy
makers’ trade-off between the variance of inﬂation relative to target, the variance of the
output gap, and the variance of (changes in) interest rates (to address parameter and data
uncertainty). However, to take account of model uncertainty, an alternative reaction
function of the Taylor-Ball-Srour type should be developed and used regularly.27
•  As to risks, it is helpful to follow a three-part approach. The elements would be: (1)
conﬁdence bands, based on past projection errors and simulation analysis, around
inﬂation and output predictions in base case and alternative scenarios; (2) alternative
scenarios of key risks (that are typically about the size and persistence of additive
shocks); (3) no-change policy scenarios (monetary conditions constant for 2 to 4
quarters) to highlight the cost of delaying policy actions.
• Other information should be reviewed for its consistency with the base case story being
presented for consideration by the policy makers. In Canada, this involves reports from
the Bank’s regional representatives on their reading of the economy, and the
presentation of the implications for the path of monetary conditions of an alternative
paradigm based on monetary and credit aggregates (to address model uncertainty).
With the explosion in research on monetary policy under uncertainty and monetary policy
rules leading to new insights on a regular basis, this is an exciting time to work at a central bank.28
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FIGURE 1 Monetary Rules with Historical Distribution of Shocks























































































































FIGURE 2 Some Taylor Rules with Historical Distribution of Shocks
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See note to Figure 1.36
FIGURE 3 Some Taylor Rules with Historical Distribution of Shocks
(Exchange Rate Variability as Experienced in Recent History)
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See note to Figure 1.37
FIGURE 4 Percentage Distribution of Expected Price Increases
Over the Next Six Months
FIGURE 5 Consensus Forecasts of CPI Inﬂation
Source: Conference Board of Canada, Index of Business Conﬁdence
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